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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. PETERSON, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON, 
Appellee. 
Case No. 930437-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to the provisions of §78-2a-3(2)(i), Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OP ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for appeal: 
Whether or not the trial court committed error in denying 
Appellant's Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant filed a Complaint for divorce on or about April 24, 
1992, to which the Appellee filed an Answer and Counterclaim. On 
October 8, 1992, Appellant appeared pro se before Howard H. 
Maetani, Commissioner, for a default divorce proceeding based upon 
the terms of a Stipulation between the parties which was actually 
filed the following day, October 9, 1992. Neither Appellee nor her 
counsel were present at the time of the default hearing. On 
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October 9, 1992, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together 
with a Decree of Divorce were presented to the Commissioner, signed 
and entered. On November 19, 1992, Appellant filed a document 
entitled Motion for Change of Venue and a Property Settlement Trial 
and a Request for Hearing (Addendum Exhibit 1) to which Appellee 
filed a Response. Commissioner Maetani, after reviewing the matter 
and having made findings, recommended that the motion of the 
Appellant be denied. In the written Opinion of the Commissioner 
dated December 7, 1992, he specifically stated that the parties had 
ten (10) days to file specific written objections to his ruling 
with the clerk of the court. 
Appellant then filed a document entitled Motion for Property 
Settlement Trial on December 8, 1992, (Addendum Exhibit 2) and on 
December 17, 1992, filed an Objection to Ruling (Addendum, Exhibit 
3). On January 12, 1993, the Appellant filed a document entitled 
Motion to Correct and Amend the Decree of Divorce to Conform to the 
Law (Addendum, Exhibit 4). On January 13, 1993, District Judge Ray 
M. Harding entered an Order which upheld the recommendations and 
ruling of the Commissioner and denied Appellant's Motion for Change 
of Venue as inappropriate. 
The Appellant next filed a document entitled Objection to 
Order and Request for Hearing on January 27, 1993, (Addendum, 
Exhibit 5). Judge Harding again considered the matter and again 
denied Appellant's motion on February 9, 1993. 
On or about March 22, 1993, Appellant filed another motion 
entitled Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
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(Addendum, Exhibit 6), then on May 3, 1993, the Appellant filed a 
document entitled Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic 
Relations Order (Addendum, Exhibit 7) . Judge Harding, while 
indicating that he was not certain as to what the Appellant 
intended by the request, treated them as motions for relief from 
the Stipulation and Decree. The Court found that the requests did 
not raise any additional issues which had not previously been ruled 
upon by the Court and therefore denied the requests of Appellant. 
It is that denial on which the Appellant takes this appeal. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS 
Appellant's appeal should be dismissed as the issues raised 
concerning the original Decree are not timely. 
Commissioner Maetani had the statutory authority to enter a 
Decree upon a Stipulation in a default hearing (especially where 
the moving party was the Appellant) based upon the provisions of 
Rule 6-401, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
The lower court's denials of the various motions of the 
Appellant for relief from the Decree of Divorce were correct. 
The remainder of issues raised by the Appellant are without 
merit. 
The Appellant should be required to pay Appellee's attorneys 
fees and costs of this appeal. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS IT IS NOT TIMELY. 
As set forth in the facts recited above, the Appellant in this 
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case signed a Stipulation dated October 7, 1992, which dealt with 
the issues of the marriage. The Appellant then appeared before the 
Divorce Commissioner on October 8, 1992, and represented that the 
matter had been resolved by Stipulation of the parties. The 
Appellant was the only person who appeared before the Commissioner 
and gave grounds for the divorce. The Decree of Divorce was signed 
on the 9th day of October, 1992. The Appellant did not file any 
documents objecting to the Decree or Stipulation until November 19, 
1992. Even giving the Appellant the benefit of the doubt and 
treating his Motion for Property Settlement Trial and Motion for 
Change of Venue as a motion for a new trial, said motion was not 
filed timely. A motion for new trial under Rule 59, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, must be filed within ten (10) days of the entry of 
judgment. The motions of the Appellant were nonetheless considered 
by the Commissioner and denied. The objection of the Appellant was 
filed and the issue was considered by the District Court, Judge Ray 
M. Harding, who also denied the motions on the 13th of January, 
1993. 
At that time, treating the requests of the Appellant for trial 
as a motion for new trial, Appellant would have 30 days from the 
13th of January, 1993, to appeal the Decree of Divorce. No appeal 
was filed. 
The Appellant filed a similar set of motions, which Judge 
Harding considered and denied on February 9, 1993. Again, giving 
the Appellant the benefit of the doubt and considering the 
additional motions as requests for relief from the Decree under the 
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provisions of Rule 60(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, he 
would have 90 days from which to appeal the denial of said motions 
for relief. Appellant never did file an appeal from Judge 
Harding's ruling. Therefore, this appeal is not timely. Appellant 
cannot stretch his time to appeal by refiling motions on the same 
issues as he has done in this case. See Burgers v. Maiben, 652 
P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). 
POINT II 
COMMISSIONER MAETANI HAD THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE 
DECREE IN THIS CASE, AS THE MATTER WAS A DEFAULT AND COMES WITHIN 
THE AUTHORITY GRANTED BY RULE 6-401 OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION. 
The Decree entered in this matter was properly within the 
authority of the Commissioner. As stated above, the matter was set 
as a default matter upon the stipulation of the parties and at the 
request of Appellant. The Decree entered was in accordance with 
the terms of the Stipulation of the parties. Rule 6-401(2)(G) , 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, specifically provides 
authority of the Commissioner to "Adjudicate default and 
uncontested divorces and uncontested modifications." 
Appellant cites Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 
1992) as authority for the proposition that the Commissioner in 
this case did not have the authority to act in the matter. 
However, that case specifically recognizes the authority of the 
Commissioner under Rule 6-401 to enter default decrees as was done 
in this case. 
The Decree of Divorce in this case has been validly entered 
and the provisions of such should be binding upon the parties. 
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POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT" S DENIAL OF THE VARIOUS MOTIONS OF THE APPELLANT 
FOR RELIEF FROM THE DECREE WAS CORRECT. 
Appellant's argument that the Commissioner acted without 
authority in denying him an evidentiary hearing on the issues 
raised by his various motions for trial and change of venue is also 
without merit. Appellant cites Holm, supra., as authority for this 
contention. However, in the present case, the Commissioner did not 
enter a final order, but merely made recommendations to which the 
Appellant objected, following which, after consideration, the 
District Judge, denied Appellant's requests. This procedure is the 
procedure which is contemplated by Holm. As stated at 840 P.2d at 
167: 
Rule 6-401 grants commissioners the authority and duty to, 
among other things, conduct hearing with parties and their 
counsel, and to make recommendations to the parties and the 
court regarding any issue in domestic relations• These 
provisions are clearly constitutional, since ultimate decision 
making remains with the judge. 
In the present case, the Commissioner merely made recommendations 
to the Court which Judge Harding ultimately considered and ruled 
upon. The February 9, 1993, ruling was the result of a direct 
consideration of the Appellant's contention by Judge Harding 
without input or consideration of the Commissioner at all. 
Further, the Court correctly ruled in holding the Appellant to 
the terms of the Decree where the Decree was based upon the 
Stipulation of the parties. Despite numerous assertions in the 
Stipulation entered into by the parties to the effect that the 
Appellant "specifically states that he is free of coercion, and 
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that no one is forcing him to give his approval to these terms;11 
that he felt the terms were reasonable and fair; that was under no 
obligation to enter into the Stipulation; the Appellant alleged 
that he was not bound. In court he was also questioned by the 
Commissioner on the record concerning his understanding and 
acceptance of the terms of the Stipulation without an indication 
from Appellant that he was at all hesitant or concerned about any 
of the terms. Under Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (1990), the 
Appellant is bound unless he can show good cause. In this case the 
good cause suggested by the Appellant consists of complaints that 
the judicial system is gender biased which resulted in unfairness 
in the treatment of the Appellant. That allegation does not 
explain why the Appellant would agree to terms which he later 
claimed to be unfair. His complaint does not seem to be centered 
upon any claim that the Decree does not reflect the terms of the 
Stipulation, only that what he once agreed to is now unfair. His 
present "seller's remorse" does not constitute good cause for which 
the agreement of the parties should now be abrogated. 
POINT IV 
THE REMAINDER OP APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Appellant raises additional arguments, such as requests that 
the appellate court make orders dividing the property, retirement 
and other requests which are not appropriate actions for an 
appellate court to take with the case in its present posture. 
Accordingly, Appellee does not respond to those additional issues. 
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POINT V 
THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PAY APPELLEE'S ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND COSTS FOR THIS APPEAL. 
Pursuant to Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure# the 
Appellant should be required to pay and the court should award 
attorney's fees and costs to the Appellee in the event the Court 
determines the appeal to be frivolous and without merit. In this 
matter, the record is clear that the Appellant has continually 
filed frivolous motions to which the Appellee has been required to 
respond. This action includes the appeal. Appellant has not 
raised any issues of merit in this appeal and the brief submitted 
is replete with inappropriate juvenile rantings condemning 
Appellee's counsel, the Court, and the judicial system. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's appeal in this matter should be denied and the 
decision of the lower court upheld. Appellee should be awarded her 
costs of appeal including a reasonable attorney's fee in this 
matter. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1994. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
MICHAEJ/D. ESPLIN' 
Attorney for Appellee 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 2nd day 
of February, 1994, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to 
the following: 
Robert H. Peterson 
Pro Se 
500 South Main 
PO Box 435 
Springville, UT 84663 
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ADDENDUM 
Statutes 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(i) 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-401 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(a) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)(3) 
Exhibits 
Exhibit 1 - Motion for a Change of Venue and a Property Settlement 
Trial and a Request for a Hearing 
Exhibit 2 - Motion for a Property Settlement Trial 
Exhibit 3 - Objection to the Ruling of the Court 
Request for a Jury Trial 
Exhibit 4 - Motion to Correct and Amend the Decree of Divorce to 
Conform to the Law 
Exhibit 5 - Objection to the Order and Request for a Hearing 
Exhibit 6 - Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order 
Exhibit 7 - Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations 
Order 
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a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Fil ing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of A p p e a l s jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child cus-
tody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
qui rements of Tit le 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings. 1992 
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of act ions by Supreme C o u r t 
Review of the judgments , orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. L o c a t i o n of Court o f A p p e a l s . 
The Cour t of Appeals has its principal location in 
Sal t Lake City. The Court of Appeals may perform 
any of its functions in any location within the s ta te . 
1986 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. 
78-3-4. 
78-3-5. 
78-3-6. 
Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when circuit and district court 
merged. 
Repealed. 
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. 
78-3-12. 
78-3-12.5. 
78-3-13. 
78-3-13.4. 
78-3-13.5, 
78-3-14.5. 
78-3-15 to 
78-3-17.5. 
78-3-18. 
78-3-19. 
78-3-20. 
78-3-21. 
78-3-21.5. 
78-3-22. 
78-3-23. 
78-3-24. 
State District Court Administrative 
System. 
Repealed. 
Costs of system. 
Repealed. 
Counties joining court system — Pro-
cedure — Facilities — Salaries. 
78-3-14. Repealed. 
Allocation of district court fees and 
fines. 
78-3-17. Repealed. 
Application of savings accruing to 
counties. 
Judicial Administration Act — Short 
title. 
Purpose of act. 
Definitions. 
Judicial Council — Creation — Mem-
bers — Terms and election — Re-
sponsibilities — Reports. 
Data bases for judicial boards. 
Presiding officer — Compensation — 
Duties. 
Administrator of the courts — Ap-
pointment — Qualifications — Sal-
ary. 
Court administrator — Powers, du-
ties, and responsibilities. 
Section 
78-3-25. 
78-3-26. 
78-3-27. 
78-3-28. 
78-3-29. 
78-3-30. 
78-3-31. 
As 
C( 
Ai 
R< 
Pi 
Di 
C< 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. 
78-3-3. Term c 
Judges of the c 
tially until the f 
three years afle 
ment. Thereaftei 
district courts is 
first Monday in 
election. A judge 
request of the J 
appointed and qi 
78-3-4. Jurisdi 
cuit < 
when 
merg< 
(1) The distric 
matters civil an< 
Constitution an< 
(2) The distric 
dinary writs an<j 
effect their orde 
(3) Under the 
officer of the Ju< 
established by tl 
district court, w 
jurisdiction of th 
the circuit court 
court in multip^ 
judge in single j 
cases may be m 
upon the motio 
When an order i 
shall transmit tl 
court to which 
court has the sai 
originally comn 
appeals from fin 
Appeals. 
(4) Appeals fi 
decrees of the di 
and 78-2a-3. 
(5) The distri 
agency adjudica 
63, Chapter 461^  
shall comply wi 
in its review ol 
(6) When a ci 
late jurisdiction 
trict court of th 
merged into o 
78-1-2.4, the di 
Notwithstandiif 
R u l e 6-401 U U U J L vr OKJX^X^^ 
Applicabil i ty 
This rule shall apply to the Council, the Adminis-
trative Office, the Board of District Court Judges and 
the statutory panel 
S ta tement of the Rule: 
(1) The presiding officer of the Council shall ap-
point a panel of five district court judges m accor-
dance with Utah Code Ann Section 77-10a-2 to hear 
information which may justify the calling of a grand 
jury 
(2) One judge shall be appointed from the first or 
second district for a five year term, one judge shall be 
appointed from the third district for a four year term, 
one judge shall be appointed from the fourth district 
for a three year term, one judge shall be appointed 
from the fifth, sixth, seventh or eighth distnct for a 
two year term, and one judge shall be appointed from 
the third district for a one year term Following the 
first term all terms on the panel are for five years 
(3) As vacancies occur or terms expire on the 
panel, the Board shall recommend to the presiding 
officer of the Council a judge to fill the unexpired 
portion of the term or to serve a new term 
(4) The Court Administrator shall designate a staff 
member to serve as secretariat to the panel and to 
coordinate scheduling, budget and other administra-
tive activities 
(5) The Administrative Office, a t the direction of 
the panel, shall annually publish a schedule which 
provides for a panel hearing in each judicial distnct 
every three years 
(6) Thirty days prior to the hearing, the panel shall 
give public notice of the hearing 
(7) The panel shall develop necessary procedures 
for its operation and shall publish such procedures as 
an appendix to this Code 
(Added effective April 15, 1991 ) 
ARTICLE 4. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS. 
Rule 6-401. Domestic relations commissioners. 
Intent: 
To identify the types of cases and matters which 
commissioners are authorized to hear, to identify the 
types of relief which commissioners may recommend 
and to identify the types of final orders which may be 
issued by commissioners 
To establish a procedure for judicial review of com-
missioners' decisions 
Applicabil i ty 
This rule shall govern all domestic relations court 
commissioners serving in the District Courts 
S ta tement of the Rule: 
(1) Types of cases a n d m a t t e r s . All domestic re 
lations matters filed in the district court in counties 
where court commissioners are appointed and serv-
ing including all divorce, annulment, paternity and 
spouse abuse matters, orders to show cause, schedul-
ing and settlement conferences, petitions to modify 
di\orce decrees scheduling conferences, and all other 
applications for relief, shall be referred to the com 
missioner upon filing with the clerk of the court un 
less otherwise ordered by the Presiding Judge of the 
District 
(2) Author i ty of C o u r t Commiss ioner . Court 
commissioners shall have the following authority 
(A) Upon notice require the personal appear-
ance of parties and their counsel, 
(B) Require the filing of financial disclosure 
statements and proposed settlement forms by the 
parties, 
(C) Obtain child custody evaluations from the 
Division of Family Services pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann Section 62A-4-106, or through the pri-
vate sector, 
(D) Make recommendations to the court re-
garding any issue in domestic relations or spouse 
abuse cases at any stage of the proceedings, 
(E) Require counsel to file with the initial or 
responsive pleading, a certificate based upon the 
facts available at that time, stating whether 
there is a legal action pending or previously adju 
dicated in a district or juvenile court of any s ta te 
regarding the minor child(ren) in the current 
case, 
(F) At the commissioner's discretion, and after 
notice to all parties or their counsel, conduct evi-
dentiary hearings consistent with paragraph 
(3KC) below, 
(G) Adjudicate default and uncontested di-
vorces and uncontested modifications, 
(H) Enter a default judgment or impose sanc-
tions against any party who fails to comply with 
the commissioner's requirements of attendance 
or production of discovery, 
(I) Impose sanctions against any person who 
acts contemptuously under Utah Code Ann Sec-
tion 78-32-10, 
(J) Issue temporary or ex parte orders, 
(K) Conduct settlement conferences with the 
parties and their counsel for the purpose of facili-
tating settlement of any or all issues in a domes-
tic relations case Issues which cannot be agreed 
upon by the parties at the settlement conference 
shall be certified to the district court for tr ial , 
and 
(L) Conduct pretrial conferences with the par-
ties and their counsel on all domestic relations 
matters unless otherwise ordered by the presid-
ing judge The commissioner shall make recom-
mendations on all issues under consideration a t 
the pretrial and submit those recommendations 
to the district court 
(3) Dut ies of Cour t Commissioner . Under the 
general supervision of the presiding judge, the court 
commissioner has the following duties prior to any 
domestic matter being heard by the district court 
(A) Review all pleadings in each case, 
(B) Certify those cases directly to the district 
court that appear to require a hearing before the 
district court judge, 
(C) Except in cases previously certified to the 
district court, conduct hearings with parties and 
their counsel for the purpose of submitting rec-
ommendations to the parties and the court, 
(D) Coordinate information with the juvenile 
court regarding previous or pending proceedings 
involving children of the parties, and 
(E) Refer appropriate cases to mediation pro-
grams if available 
(4) Object ions. With the exception of pre trial or-
ders, the commissioner's recommendation is the order 
of the court until modified by the court Any party 
objecting to the recommended order, shall file a writ-
ten objection to the recommendation with the clerk of 
the court and serve copies on the commissioner's of-
fice and opposing counsel Objections shall be filed 
within ten days of the date the recommendation was 
made in open court or if taken under advisement, ten 
days after the date of the subsequent written recom-
mendation made by the commissioner. Objections 
shall be to specific recommendations and shall set 
forth reasons for each objection. 
(5) Judicial review. Cases not resolved at the set-
tlement or pretrial conference shall be set for trial on 
all issues not resolved. All other matters shall be re-
viewed in accordance with Rule 4-501. 
(6) Prohibitions. 
(A) Commissioners shall not make final adju-
dications of domestic relations matters other 
than default or uncontested divorces and modifi-
cations. 
(B) Commissioners shall not serve as pro tem-
pore judges in any matter, except as provided by 
Rule of the Supreme Court. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 
1991.) 
Rule 6-402. Repealed. 
Rule 6-403. Shortening 90-day waiting period in 
domestic matters. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure for shortening or waiving 
the 90-day waiting period in domestic cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Proceedings on the merits of a divorce action 
shall not be heard by the district courts unless 90 
days have elapsed from the time the complaint was 
filed or unless the Court finds that there is good cause 
for shortening or eliminating the waiting period and 
enters a formal order to that effect prior to the hear-
ing date. 
(2) Application for a hearing less than 90 days 
from the date the complaint was filed shall be made 
by motion and accompanied by an affidavit setting 
forth the factual matters constituting good cause. The 
motion and supporting affidavit(s) shall be served on 
the opposing party at least five days prior to the 
scheduled hearing unless the party is in default. 
(3) In the event the Court finds that there is good 
cause for hearing in less than 90 days from the filing 
of the complaint, the facts constituting such cause 
shall be included in the findings of fact and presented 
to the Court for signature. 
Rule 6-404. Modification of divorce decrees. 
Intent: 
To establish procedures for modification of existing 
divorce decrees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all district courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be 
commenced by the filing of a petition to modify in the 
original divorce action. Service of the petition and 
summons upon the opposing party shall be in accor-
dance with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. No request for a modifica-
tion of an existing decree shall be raised by way of an 
order to show cause. 
(2) The responding party shall serve the reply 
within twenty days after service of the petition. Ei-
ther party may file a certificate of readiness for trial. 
Upon filing of the certificate, the matter shall be re-
ferred to the domestic relations commissioner prior to 
trial, or in those districts where there is not a domes-
tic relations commissioner, placed on the trial calen-
dar. 
(3) No petition for modification shall be placed on a 
law and motion or order to show cause calendar with-
out the consent of the commissioner or the district 
judge. 
Rule 6-405. Repealed. 
Rule 6-406. Opening sealed adoption files. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform procedures for opening sealed 
adoption files and providing identifying information 
to adoptees and/or birth parents. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all district and juvenile 
courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) All requests to open sealed adoption files to ob-
tain identifying information of adoptee or birth par-
ents shall be initiated by filing a formal petition with 
the clerk of the court in the county where the adop-
tion was granted. The petition must set forth in detail 
the reasons the information is desired and must be 
accompanied by a filing fee of $75.00. Neither a for-
mal petition nor a filing fee is required to obtain cer-
tified copies of the decree. 
(2) In cases where the petitioner is seeking specific 
medical information to aid in the preservation of the 
health of the petitioner, the petitioner must contact 
the Bureau of Vital Statistics and the adoption 
agency involved in the placement (if applicable) and 
make a request for all non-identifying information 
regarding the birth parents and other relatives. The 
petition must be accompanied by a letter from a li-
censed physician stating what the need is and 
whether the information is necessary for the preser-
vation of the health of the petitioner. 
(3) In cases where the petitioner is requesting the 
information for reasons other than to acquire specific 
medical data needed to aid in the preservation of the 
health of the petitioner, the petitioner must register 
with the Voluntary Adoption Registry established by 
the Bureau of Vital Statistics in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-30-18. 
(4) Upon receipt of the petition, filing fee, and sup-
porting documents, the court may set the matter for 
hearing. Petitioner shall give notice of the hearing 
date and time to the placement agency or the attor-
ney who handled the private placement. The notice 
shall advise the placement agency or the attorney of 
the petition and request their attendance at the hear-
ing or their written response to the petition. 
(5) After a hearing, the court shall make specific 
findings of fact that good cause exists and that the 
adoption records shall be opened to petitioner. The 
findings shall address such issues as whether the 
birth parents should be notified of the petition and 
given the opportunity to respond, and if it is not pos-
sible to contact the birth parents, why the adoptee's 
need to know overrides the duty of confidentiality 
owed to the birth parents. 
(6) Upon a finding of good cause to open to the 
adoption records, the court shall specify which 
records or portions of records the petitioner may have 
access to. The court should be sensitive to the fact 
that some of the records may not be appropriate for 
release to the adoptee, including agency notes regard-
ing the personal observations of the birth parents and 
the circumstances surrounding the birth, etc. The 
court shall carefully consider what effect the release 
of such information would have on the parties in-
volved and may restrict access to such information in 
the court records as well as the records of the adop-
tion agency. 
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tice or judge concurring or dissenting may likewise 
give reasons in writing and file the same with the 
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records of the 
court shall constitute the entry of the judgment of the 
court. 
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argu-
ment, the court concludes that a case satisfies the 
criteria set forth in Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the 
case by order without written opinion. The decision 
shall have only such effect as precedent as is provided 
for by Rule 31(f). 
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the 
entry of the decision, the clerk shall give notice to the 
respective parties and make the decision public in 
accordance with the direction of the court. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 31. Expedited appeals decided after oral 
argument without written opinion. 
(a) Motion and stipulation for expedited hear-
ing. After the filing of ail briefs in an appeal, a party 
may move for an expedited decision without a written 
opinion. The motion shall be in the form prescribed 
by Rule 23 and shall describe the nature of the case, 
the issues presented and any special reasons the par-
ties may have for an expedited decision. The court 
may dispose of any qualified case under this rule 
upon its own motion before or after oral argument. 
(b) Cases which qualify for expedited decision. 
The following are matters which the court may con-
sider for expedited decision without opinion: 
(1) appeals involving uncomplicated factual is-
sues based primarily on documents; 
(2) summary judgments; 
(3) dismissals for failure to state a claim; 
(4) dismissals for lack of personal or subject 
matter jurisdiction; and 
(5) judgments or orders based on uncompli-
cated issues of law. 
(c) In all motions brought under this rule, the sub-
stantive rules of law should be deemed settled, al-
though the parties may differ as to their application. 
(d) Appeals ineligible for expedited decision. 
The court will not grant a motion for an expedited 
appeal in cases raising substantial constitutional is-
sues, issues of significant public interest, issues of 
law of first impression, or complicated issues of fact or 
law. 
(e) Procedure if expedited motion is granted. If 
a motion for expedited decision is granted, the appeal 
will be given an expedited setting for oral argument 
within 45 to 60 days from the date of the order grant-
ing the motion. Within two days after submission of 
the appeal, the court will conference, decide the case, 
and issue a written order which need not be accompa-
nied by an opinion. Entry of the order by the clerk in 
the records of the court, shall constitute the entry of 
the judgment of the court. 
(f) Effect as precedent Appeals decided under 
this rule will not stand as precedent, but, in other 
respects, will have the same force and effect as other 
decisions of the court. 
(g) Issuance of written opinion. If it appears to 
the court after the case has been submitted for deci-
sion that a written opinion should be issued, the time 
limitation in paragraph (e) shall not apply and the 
parties will be so notified. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 32. Interest on judgment. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for 
money in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is 
allowed by law shall be payable from the date the 
judgment was entered in the trial court. 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; 
recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Ex-
cept in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the 
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken 
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it 
shall award just damages, which may include single 
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reason-
able attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court 
may order that the damages be paid by the party or 
by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a 
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one 
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by exist-
ing law, or not based on a good faith argument to 
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the pur-
pose of delay is one interposed for any improper pur-
pose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the 
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only 
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon re-
quest of any party or upon its own motion. A 
party may request damages under this rule only 
as part of the appellee's motion for summary dis-
position under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's 
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion 
or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion 
of the court, the court shall issue to the party or 
the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. 
The order to show cause shall set forth the alle-
gations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond un-
less otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The 
order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom dam-
ages may be awarded, the court shall grant a 
hearing. 
Rule 54. Award of costs. 
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be 
taxed Against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment 
or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against ap-
pellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or 
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the ap-
pellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or or-
der is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs 
shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall 
not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case. 
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In 
cases involving the state of Utah or an agency or 
officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the 
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless 
specifically required or prohibited by law. 
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, 
bonds and other expenses on appeal. The follow-
ing may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing 
party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or 
typewritten brief or memoranda and attachments not 
to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in 
the preparation and transmission of the record, in-
cluding costs of the reporter's transcript unless other-
ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affida-
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable attor-
ney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may 
be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judg-
ment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, 
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right 
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circum-
stances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and 
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does 
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases 
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy 
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and 
may advance it on the calendar. 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless 
the court otherwise directs and subject to the provi-
sions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a 
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict ac-
companied by answers to interrogatories returned by 
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the 
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith 
signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided 
in Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of 
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in regis-
ter of actions and judgment docket A judgment is 
complete and shall be deemed entered for all pur-
poses, except the creation of a lien on real property, 
when the same is signed and filed as herein above 
provided. The clerk shall immediately make a nota-
tion of the judgment in the register of actions and the 
judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The 
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk 
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of 
this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party 
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact 
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be 
rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judg-
ment by confession is authorized by statute, the party 
seeking the same must file with the clerk of the court 
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, 
verified by the defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money 
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the 
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the 
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contin-
gent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not ex-
ceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for 
a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the state-
ment, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment 
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of 
entry, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment. 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judg-
ment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any 
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, 
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor 
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed 
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within 
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the 
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly ac-
knowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by ac-
knowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the 
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the 
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the 
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satis-
faction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more 
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid 
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming 
them. 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judg-
ment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of 
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall 
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was 
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof, 
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to 
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the 
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered 
upon the docket. 
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction 
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the 
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case, 
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also 
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, in-
cluding the amount paid, on the margin of the judg-
ment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfac-
tion. 
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall 
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any 
judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon 
the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the 
extent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to 
be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execu-
tion shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such 
execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of 
such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to 
collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from 
the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon. 
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other 
counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall 
have been entered on the judgment docket of the 
county where such judgment was first docketed, a 
certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by 
the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with 
the clerk of the district court in any other county 
where the judgment may have been docketed. There-
upon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be 
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall 
have the same effect as in the county where the same 
was originally entered. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, 
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the follow-
ing causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a 
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court 
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and con-
clusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or 
Rule 60 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 618 
abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any 
one or more of the jurors have been induced to 
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the 
court, by resort to a determination by chance or 
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary pru-
dence could not have guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for 
the party making the application, which he couid 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced a t the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appear-
ing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for mot ion. A motion for a new trial 
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry 
of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; t ime for filing. When the applica-
tion for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), 
(2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. 
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affi-
davits they shall be served with the motion. The op-
posing party has 10 days afler such service within 
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be 
served may be extended for an additional period not 
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The 
court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On ini t ia t ive of court. Not later than 10 days 
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative 
may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, 
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter o r amend a j u d g m e n t A mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served 
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 60. Relief from j u d g m e n t o r o r d e r . 
(a) Clerical mi s t akes . Clerical mistakes in judg-
ments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court a t any time of its own initiative 
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if 
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an 
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the 
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereaf-
ter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; i nadve r t ence ; ex cu s ab l e neglect; 
newly d i scovered evidence; f raud , e tc . On motion 
at\d upon such terms as are 3ust, Vhe court may \u lhs> 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal rep-
resentative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadver-
tence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, 
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality 
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an indepen-
dent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud 
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
Kule 61. Harmless e r ro r . 
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of 
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order 
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any 
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or 
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless re-
fusal to take such action appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice. The court a t every 
Stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties. 
Rule 62. Stay of p roceed ings to enforce a judg-
ment . 
(a> Stay upon en t ry of j u d g m e n t Execution or 
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue 
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless 
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for 
the security of the adverse party as are proper, other-
wise directs. 
(b) Stay on motion for n e w tr ial o r for j udg-
m e n t In its discretion and on such conditions for the 
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court 
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to en-
force, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion 
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made 
pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a 
judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a 
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for 
a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a 
motion for amendment to the findings or for addi-
tional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b). 
(a Injunction pend ing appea l . When an appeal 
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment 
granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the 
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, 
or grant an injunction during the pendency of the 
appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for 
the security of the rights of the adverse party. 
(d) Stay upon appea l . When an appeal is taken 
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may ob-
tain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited 
by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or 
after the tune of filing the notice of appeal. The stay 
is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by 
the court. 
(e' Stay in favor of the s ta te , o r agency thereof. 
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the 
state oi Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by 
direction of any department of either, and the opera-
tion or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no 
bond, obligation, or other security shall be required 
from the appellant. 
Robert H. Peterson acting pro se 
500 South Main P.O. Box 435 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. PETERSON 
Plaintiff : MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF 
: VENUE AND A PROPERTY 
: SETTLEMENT TRIAL 
: AND A REQUEST FOR A 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON : HEARING 
Defendant : Judge Harding 
Civil No. 924400839 
Comes now the Plaintiff declaring the signature on all 
Divorce documents, and on the document setting up the conditions of 
the interim period, signed by the Plaintiff, were obtained by lies, 
fraud and coercion and financial hardship. The bias of this Court 
for the Defendant and her Counsel, and against any person acting 
pro se, amounts to coercion on the part of the Court. The Court 
has allowed the Counsel to fill in words, in statements made by the 
Court, and thus mold the thinking of the Court. The golden rule of 
this Court is; to denie each and every request by the person acting 
pro se, no matter how benign that request might be. The Court has 
systematically denied the Plaintiff's request to review the 
atrocious conditions imposed by this Court of inequity. By this 
Court, an order has been issued to grant to the Defendant an income 
of $992.5/month from pager-voice-mail leases, $400/month from the 
Four-Plex, $88/month interest, $140/month from a sale, $200/month 
from student rental and to garnish half of the Plaintiff's $1,800 
a month income. 
EXHIBIT 1 
2. This was granted to the Defendant for a total sitting-on-her-
professional-fanny income of $2,580.50 per month. The Defendants 
expenses, without a mortgage payment were about $580/ month. Thus 
this Court has ordered that the Defendant should have $2,000 per 
month to squirrel away in her secret bank accounts each month, in 
keeping with the past 3 2 years. Thus the court would have her gain 
$2,000 each month of the estate and denie the Plaintiff enough of 
his earnings to live on. Thus by order of the Court she would have 
$14,000 in the secret account over the seven months of trial. The 
Plaintiff, by this Court's order was granted, $900/month of his 
wages and thus has been denied the right to counsel by the Court fs 
own order. The right to Counsel is a basic God-given-constitutional 
right denied by the Court through the above atrocity. The income 
($900) granted by this Court of inequity, could not support the 
Plaintiff's need for food, clothing and shelter, thus there was no 
opportunity for the Plaintiff to have Counsel. By order of the 
Court the Defendant has had the most expensive counsel available, 
with the very best delay tactics, in the Country, paid for by the 
Plaintiff each month. The Plaintiff requested a trial date on 
Aug.6, 1992. The Defendant had no intention of bringing this matter 
to trial with a Court ordered $2,000/month advantage. 
3. The Court has totally ignored the law in this case, by 
granting the Defendant control over all of the assets of the estate 
and requiring no accountability to the Plaintiff. The Court has 
violated the purpose and the spirit of this law. The law clearly 
states that the property shall be divided in half, and provides no 
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provision for one party to have complete control on a temporary, or 
a permanent basis. In addition to the above atrocity the Defendant 
paid nothing for the home she occupied. She was to obtain this from 
the savings of the Plaintiff at a later date, and did exactly that. 
Thus the income for the Defendant was $2,580.50 plus a mortgage 
payment of $53 0 or $3,110.5 per month. What possible incentive 
would the Defendant have to settle? If the Defendant had gone to 
work at her profession, she would have had over $4,000/month coming 
in. She is a professional teacher with a college degree and over 10 
years of teaching experience. No court of equity would grant 
temporary or permanent alimony in this case. I would like to be 
shown a case where a professional person of this caliber has 
received alimony from her exact counter part. This can happen only 
in this Court, a Court of extreme bias. 
4. She paid nothing for seven months toward the mortgage of the 
home she lives in, with the Courts approval. She had access to her 
undeclared estate, and monies stolen from the marriage, and was 
never required to account for these funds. ALL motions to the Court 
concerning accountability have been systematically ignored or 
denied. It is clear that the Court did not intend accountability 
since the Court refuses to require the Defendant to show where the 
$7,000 that was taken from the joint accounts was spent. The Court 
has willfully allowed the Defendant to take money from the accounts 
frozen by the Court, and place those funds in accounts, not frozen 
by the Court. This Court of inequity, has frozen all of the 
accounts of the Plaintiff. The Defendants Counsel selected which 
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accounts were to be frozen and the Plaintiff was denied any change 
in that one sided policy. 
5. During the interim period the Plaintiff wrote up several 
divisions of the property in the first and second person, and gave 
the Defendant the opportunity to choose any party, of any split. 
She, at the advice of counsel, declined any such offer. The 
Plaintiff set up a meeting with an arbitrator(CPA) of the 
Defendants choice. She never showed up. Her Counsel knew of the 
bias of the Court and thus steered her clear of anything that 
wouldn't give her the total; or very near, the total of the estate. 
Counsel was aware of the bias of the Court from past experience. 
6. The bias of the Court was very clear when the Plaintiff ask 
the Court to grant a divorce, and have a property settlement on the 
2nd of December. This was a request that would not have made one 
cent difference in the outcome of the trial. This was denied 
without hearing any arguments for or against. The Counsel for the 
Defendant filled in the Courts words "the Plaintiff needs more 
incentive to settle." This message from the Court was very clear; 
SIGN EVERYTHING YOU HAVE, OVER TO THE DEFENDANT, OR I WILL. 
Rather than to go through the mockery of a trial, I have 
signed a document doing just that. My only hope for equity, is an 
appeal to another Court. 
Dated this day the 7th day of October 1992. 
Robert H. Peterson (Plaintiff) 
Robert H. Peterson acting pro se 
BOX 435 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. PETERSON 
P l a i n t i f f : MOTION FOR A 
: PROPERTY SETTLEMENT 
: TRIAL 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON : 
Defendant : 
: Civil No. 924400839 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
1. Comes now, the Plaintiff having been coerced into signing a 
documents pertaining to the divorce of the above parties, requests 
a trial for the purpose of granting the Plaintiff an opportunity to 
be represented by counsel in an unbiased court of law and to have 
that portion of the estate that the law decrees is his, granted to 
him. 
2. The divorce as it now stands is a farce. Since no 
accountability was required by the Court and none is written into 
the divorce, there could be any amount of money, in any of the bank 
accounts granted to the Defendant. No accurate appraisal was made 
of the property. The appraisals were done by the Defendants brother 
and do not reflect the true value of the property held by the 
Defendant. None of the estate owned by the Defendant was ever 
revealed to the Court or the Plaintiff. She was never required to 
state where her Utah State retirement was or the amount held. She 
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was never required to show where the family investments were or the 
amount accrued. If she claimed these moneys to be inherited the 
Court required no proof of inherited money, so family investments 
were designated by the Defendant as inherited, and were not 
considered in the proceedings. She was free to move money in and 
out of the accounts, while the Plaintiff was ordered not to touch 
any of his personal savings. Fourteen thousand dollars of the 
Plaintiffs personal savings were given to the Defendant prior to 
the Divorce to pay the outstanding bills on the home. None of these 
bills have been paid except the amount given to counsel for the 
Defendant obtained by fraud. This money has been tucked away as all 
other funds have been for the past 32 years of marriage. 
3, A verbal agreement, as reflected in the divorce, was that each 
party was to pay his or her own attorneys fees. A few days prior to 
the marriage of the Plaintiff counsel for the Defendant added a 
$2,000 attorney fee to be paid to her as though it was in the cost 
of redeeming the home. She was hoping that since the Plaintiff had 
no counsel and could not afford it, he would not see this addition. 
The Plaintiff stated clearly, directly, to Marilyn Brown, counsel 
for the Defendant, that he was being coerced into signing this 
agreement. She knew the Plaintiff had no counsel in this matter and 
she knew that because of the pending marriage of the Plaintiff that 
he would sign anything to be rid of the hate, in his life and marry 
someone that truly loves him. Seven months of two to four hours of 
sleep ,living in abject poverty, loosing ones health, and the 
ability to perform on the job, and the pending marriage put the 
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Plaintiff in a very susceptible position. 
4. Thus the counsel for the Defendant entrapped the Plaintiff by 
having him sign something she new was a farce but something she 
thought would hold up in Court, 
5. Thus, each time the Plaintiff came to sign the documents new 
paragraphs were added with no discussion. 
6. The bias of the Court did not require accountability. The 
Court rubber stamped all documents submitted by Counsel for the 
Defendant with out examination. There is no lease with the amount 
$398/ month as stated, there is only a lease for $700/ month and 
two others in the Plaintiffs name for a total of $195/ month and 
one in the Defendants name at $97.5/month. This is another attempt 
on the part of the Defendant's counsel to defraud the Plaintiff and 
to keep the accured amounts in each account belonging to the 
Plaintiff. No attempt has been made to pay any of these funds due 
or abide in any way by the unjust terms of this atrocity. 
7. If the Court had required the Defendant to account for the 
funds stolen from frozen accounts this would have revealed the 
atrocity of the settlement. Any such accountability would have 
shown this settlement in clear violation of the law and equity. 
It is not equitable that the Defendant have half of the Plaintiff's 
retirement and the income from the Four-Plex. The Divorce as it now 
stands, grants the idler double the retirement of the worker. The 
Defendant made no payments from her income for the home, or the 
Four-Plex, or the retirement of the Plaintiff. All of the 
Defendants income and much of the family investments, were tucked 
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away in her accounts and labled inheritance, never to be used 
except for separate vacations and items that benefited her only. 
8. She has contributed little or nothing in terms of labor to 
maintain these properties. Why then would a Court of equity grant 
to her all of these assets? The only answer is, that the Court 
bought the "poor-housewife-act", that she is so good at. It is not 
lawful or fair that all of the property and all of the good 
investments of the marriage, amounting to hundreds of thousands of 
dollars, be granted to Defendant and the near worthless 
investments, amounting to a few thousand dollars be granted to the 
Plaintiff. 
9. The Defendant was angry at the Plaintiff for slamming the door 
at 8:00 AM, on his way to work and waking her. She often complained 
the apartments or the home needed repair, that the lawn needed to 
be mowed, or the garden weeded, since the work of maintenance was 
assigned to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. As might be expected 
she collected the rent. 
10. To let this atrocity stand, would confirm, that there is no 
equity in the Courts. We have lost our right to a trial by a jury 
of our peers in the divorce court, the tax court, in foreclosure 
and is rarely granted in any other court. If this divorce stands , 
then we can say, the constitutional right to counsel has also been 
lost. Our courts are nothing but a big business, designed to delay, 
intimidate, agitate and avoid the issue until the lawyers have most 
of the property in question. 
Dated this day December 8, 1992. . — 7 
The P l a i n t i f f [JT/yxl^HT /^(Jjs7/?}tAJ-y\> Robert H. Peterson 
Robert H. Peterson acting pro se 
500 South Main 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519 
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IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
D u b. . • J : v> o «-
ROBERT H. PETERSON 
Plaintiff 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON 
Defendant 
THE OBJECTION TO 
RULING OF THE 
COURT 
REQUEST FOR A JURY 
TRIAL 
COMMISSIONER MAETANI 
Civil No, 924400839 
Comes now the Plaintiff objects to the ruling of the Court 
since none of the items raised by the Plaintiff were addressed in 
the Ruling. The question of representation for the Plaintiff was 
not considered by the Court, The question of equity according to 
the law has not been considered by the Court. The Court has not 
considered the question of accountability according to the law. 
The history of this endless case, and as long as there is no 
trail it will be endless, as outlined by the Court reinforces the 
rubber stamping of all matters brought before the Court by the 
Defendant's counsel and consistently ignoring all matters brought 
before the Court by the Plaintiff, no matter how insignificant the 
item may be. It should be noted that the Court in it's total bias 
in this matter denied the Plaintiff's request for a ruling on the 
bases of some violation of procedure, but was very prompt to 
respond the Defendants request without input from the Plaintiff or 
without the benefit of a hearing. 
EXHIBIT 3 
The Court in it's bias has denied the Plaintiff his 
constitutional right to a hearing on all matters before the Court. 
The Court would not want the counsel for the Defendant to testify 
, and set in the record, the fact that before signing any documents 
the Plaintiff said verbally to that "counsel" on two occasions that 
he was being coerced. The Court did note correctly that the 
Plaintiff did sign the Request for a Hearing and the Stipulation on 
the same day so that there could be NO question the Plaintiff was 
being coerced. It is very important that the Court recognize that 
both written and verbal testimony exits that the Plaintiff was 
coerced. 
The history of this matter as outlined by the Court in itfs 
Ruling is void of the inputs of the Plaintiff that point to the 
coercion used against him. The Court has been consistently blind 
and deaf to the inputs of the Plaintiff. The Court allowed the 
proceedings to continue with the Defendant (the idler) with over a 
$2,400/month rent-free income and granted the Plaintiff (the 
worker) $900/month. This set up the Plaintiff with the most 
expensive wheel-spinning counsel available and forced the Plaintiff 
to fire his counsel for obvious economic reasons. When the 
Plaintiff brought this matter before the Court the response of this 
Court of inequity was that "the Plaintiff needs more incentive to 
settle". The Court denied the benign request that the divorce take 
place and then a property settlement trial take place on Dec. 2. 
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This would have given the Plaintiff access to the funds of his 
present wife, and defeated the whole purpose of the Court to force 
the Plaintiff to sign over his share of property by coercion and to 
keep him from proper counsel. 
In the matter of the income from the investments stolen by the 
Defendant from frozen accounts and the income from the Four-Plex, 
the Plaintiff was promised by the Court over and over again that 
there would be an accounting. It was pointed out to the Plaintiff 
that all of these funds would be accounted for. That would cause a 
hardship on the counsel for the Defendant. It is clear that the 
Court had no intention of ever having any form of accounting. An 
accounting would reveal the atrocity of this inequitable 
settlement, and would clearly show the Plaintiff has been coerced 
into signing all documents. The Court seems think the number of 
various documents signed, or statements sworn to, in this matter 
verifies that no coercion was present. The meat grinder of coercion 
was set up by the Court through the unwarranted garnishment of the 
Plaintiff's wages for les that $10/month more than was being paid 
by the plaintiff. The Court in it's criminal bias, allowed a 
unwarranted garnishment to occur that was against the law. The 
Court, in it's bias, would have the Plaintiff pay half of his take 
home pay to a Professional teacher, his exact counter part, unheard 
of in any court of law. Fortunately the law would not allow this 
unprecedented atrocity to take place. The signing of this document 
allowing this atrocity was obtained by the lie "that one $900/month 
payment would make the Plaintiff a free man11. To be free from the 
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theft, greed and Satanic hate of his present wife, for a mere $900 
was at the time a bargain the Plaintiff could not pass by. 
The truth of the matter was that this was the divorce decree. This 
meat grinder was to be in place until the Plaintiff signed over 
everything. There was no trial set, nor was any trial contemplated, 
that was another lie just like the lie of accountability. 
The Court has chosen in it's ruling not to put any estimated 
value on the division of property. The Four-Plex has been shown to 
be worth half of the estate. At this time the equity is about 
$51,000 and going up at $10, 000/year. With the mortgage on the home 
paid the equity there is about $40,000. The Defendant has over 
$30,000 in her personal undeclared estate $15,000 of which was 
obtained in family investments and labeled "inherited" by the 
Defendant with no accountability required by the Court. With 
another $11,000 from pager leases and about that amount saved 
during the litigation as ordered by the Court, half of the workers 
retirement ($65,000) the idler has a settlement of about $197,000. 
The Plaintiff was required to give up his savings at the Key of 
$14,000 and give that money to the idler living him with a $10,000 
investment with Boston $2,400 in bonds and $1,800 in bioteck stock. 
This is a total of $14,200 as opposed to $197,000. Note that the 
defendants half of the voice-mail and pager lease was not included 
since it is clear the Court has no intention of forcing that 
payment or correcting the amount of that payment as per the 
divorce. 
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This Court would have the world believe that this atrocity was 
obtained without coercion. If there was no coercion, and if the 
Plaintiff had been represented with proper counsel, the above claim 
in and of itself would warrant a trial. Since the Court has shown 
to have unparalleled bias in this matter the Plaintiff requests a 
trial by a jury of his peers as his God given constitutional right. 
The founding fathers put that right in the constitution to guard 
against the very atrocity show above. 
Dated this the 17th day of December 1992. 
Robert H. Peterson acting pro se 
Box 435 
Springville, Utah 84663 *&"** 
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519 or 489-7490 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. PETERSON 
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VIRGINIA T. PETERSON 
Defendant 
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AND AMEND THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
TO CONFORM TO THE 
LAW 
COMMISSIONER MAETANI 
Civil No. 924400839 
1. Whereas the Plaintiff, having been denied his constitutional 
rights, to counsel, to a trial, and access to his estate via the 
Court's unprecedented bias, requests, that the Court consider the 
aspects of a long-needless-public appeal during 1993 and order the 
following amendments to the Decree of Divorce be granted to conform 
this Divorce, to the laws of divorce in the State of Utah. 
a. That the four-plex in question should be sold by the 
Accountant Sidney Gilbert (the Defendants choice) and that the 
the Court order him to evaluate the estate and to grant to the 
Plaintiff his half of the estate in cash from the said sale, and to 
the Defendant her half of the estate. 
b. That all bank accounts holding family investments or 
income, regardless of the name or names on the accounts, such as 
the $700/ voice mail system lease, the three $97.50/month leases, 
the income from the four-plex and the total income thereof and of 
all investments, be split from January 1,1992 to the expiration 
of the said leases as per the Laws of the State of Utah (50/50). 
EXHIBIT 4 
c. That the home in question be granted to the Defendant, 
and that the equity therein be counted as part of her half of the 
estate. 
2. The Plaintiff requests that, paragraphs 25 through 31 be 
stricken from the Stipulation and the like paragraphs from the 
Decree of Divorce. These paragraphs were written by Marilyn Brown 
to cover her illegal and criminal actions, as an officer of the 
Court, and to hide the fact that she was told twice by the 
Plaintiff that he was being coerced into signing these documents. 
She knew the Plaintiff had no access to money to hire counsel, and 
she knew that none would be consulted because she had arranged this 
to be the case, via her complete control of the Court, and the bias 
of the Court. These paragraphs constitute lies and entrapment and 
are not statements pertinent to any divorce. Defendant did not have 
counsel and has testified that he was coerced into signing both the 
Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce. 
3. The Court denied the request of the Plaintiff to grant a 
divorce and then have a property settlement trial, because in the 
Court's own words, the Plaintiff needed more "incentive". It was 
the Courts position that if the Plaintiff married prior to the 
trial, his wife may have had access to money to hire counsel. 
Therefor, to insure there would be no counsel for the Plaintiff at 
the Dec. 2, 1992 trial date, the Court refused this benign request. 
There can't be any other reason for the denial since the economic 
hardship was pointed out in the garnishment hearing. As usual, the 
Court was deaf, and blind to any request by a person acting pro se. 
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4. At that time the Plaintiff was ordered by this Court to pay 
the idler, half of his wages, which violates the Law, but this 
Court of inequity never has considered the law, nor the fact that 
no other court can be found that, has taken alimony from the wages 
of one Professional Teacher and given it to another Professional 
Teacher. That sort of thing requires a tweedy bird in charge. 
Meanwhile the Defendant(the idler) was to enjoy her $3,000/ month 
of the workers past efforts. It was the Courts feeling that the 
idler should not get out of practice after 32 years, and that she 
should be able to squirrel away $2,000 a month for seven months or 
ten years, or as long as it took to get the Plaintiff to sign away 
his property, ($14,000 never to be accounted for) , this Court 
requires no accounting for clients of Marilyn Brown (the Courts 
little tweedy bird). The $7,000 stolen from the estate from the 
Alpine Credit Union joint account by Virginia Topham was not 
considered by the Court since tweedy bird said it was taken prior 
to a date, set by tweedy bird. 
5. The incredible bias of this Court would have the world believe 
that, Robert H. Peterson, a Professor that teaches calculus, gave 
Virginia Topham the four-plex (half of the estate), the home 
($41,000 equity) her estate (about $32,000) half of his retirement 
($65,000) and then turned over to this thief, of thirty two years, 
another $14,000 from his personal savings account, leaving him with 
next to nothing after his debts are paid, and did this knowing that 
the law allows him half of the estate, all without coercion. For 
this Court then to say there was "no evidence of coercion" requires 
a blindness unparalleled in the history of inequity. 
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4. The Court is trying to justify this atrocity by any means. The 
thinking of the Court that the Plaintiff at one time gave all of 
his life's work to the idler, and the thief of the marriage and 
thought that was fair, and then changed his mind is one of the 
straws the Court is grasping for. This according to this Court of 
bias would constitute a reason to let this atrocity stand as is. If 
the Court were correct and no coercion took place, consider the 
fact that the Plaintiff had no counsel and received 10% and the 
idler 90% of the estate via the most expensive wheel-spinning-lying 
-intimidating-coercive counsel available. It would be the duty and 
the obligation of the Court to make this right. The purpose of 
having courts in the land is to address inequity and to provide a 
nonviolent method of settling differences. It is very clear to the 
Plaintiff, why the divorce courts are filled with violence. The 
coercive meat grinder I have been through via the gross inequity of 
this Court would have brought many men to violence. 
5. The position the Court has taken in this case is: a; the 
total of the estate would be under the complete control of tweedy 
birds client, to include all income, and all real estate, and all 
bank accounts and the Plaintiff should have no access to any of his 
accounts, b; to take half of the workers wages for the idler 
($3,000/month income), c; to denie the Plaintiff all of his basic 
constitutional rights (hearing, trial and counsel), d; to refuse 
any accounting of income or assets of tweedy birds client and to 
continuously lie to the Plaintiff saying that an accounting would 
be made, e; to be a party to coercion via the rubber stamping of 
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any request made by tweedy bird, f; the worker was denied a place 
to live when by law he owns half of a four-plex because tweedy bird 
didnft want the Plaintiff to have the same living accommodations as 
the Defendant, that would have defeated the purpose of the meat 
grinder of coercion, ordered by tweedy bird and this Court- The 
Plaintiff was to camp out the rest of his life, if it took that 
long for the coercion to take effect. 
6. Any one of the above, constitute a good and sufficient reason 
to grant the Plaintiff a trial and a change of venue without the 
question of coercion being considered. This Court can save a great 
deal of time and money for both parties by simply conforming to the 
Law and dividing this estate in half as prescribed by the LAW. 
Dated this the 1st day of January 1993. 
bbert H. "Peter^rin 
<£^^^ 
Robert H. Peterson acting pro se 
Box 435 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ex 550 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. PETERSON 
Plaintiff : OBJECTION TO THE 
: ORDER AND REQUEST 
: FOR A HEARING 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON 
Defendant : JUDGE HARDING 
: Civil No, 924400839 
1. The Plaintiff objects to the Order submitted by Marilyn 
Brown for and in behalf of the Defendant since the Court has not 
granted the Plaintiff his constitutional right to a hearing, or any 
other constitutional right for that matter• The Courts position 
that, at some place, in some mood, at some time, the Plaintiff , 
without coercion, granted to the woman that has stolen from the 
marriage for 32 years, 92 % of the estate in question is absurd. 
Certainly if the Courts position were accurate, this would point 
out the need for counsel for the Plaintiff and it would be the 
Courts duty and sacred obligation, to order a trial and order that 
his half of the estate be released to him, according to the LAW, 
for the purpose of obtaining counsel. There is only one thing that 
stops this from happening and that is the bias of the Court. This 
Court refuses to consider the right of the Plaintiff to counsel and 
to a trial. The Court's order that the workers income should be 
$900/month and the idlers income should be $2,500/month ($2,000 
squirreling money) and that she should have total control of both 
estates is a criminal act on the part of this Court that clearly 
disqualifies this Court from further adjudication. The Plaintiff 
has objected to this atrocity over and over again. At each of these 
objections the Court has lied to the Plaintiff over and over again 
concerning accountability of the income from the four-plex and the 
investments. It is clear this Court does not require accountability 
for clients of Marilyn Brown. Accounting would reveal too much. 
2. The Court also refuses to consider an Order To Show Cause 
why the Defendant continues to steal the income from the pager and 
voice mail system assigned to the Plaintiff, by Marilyn Brown, the 
one that runs this Court. It appears Marilyn Brown has decided not 
to pay this since the Court will not hold a hearing or allow the 
Plaintiff access to any of his estate. She directed her client to 
steal $7,000 from a joint account and close two others that were 
frozen by the Court and got away with that theft, so why not 
continue to steal? The Court will hear nothing or see nothing 
submitted by the Plaintiff because he is acting pro-se. For the 
Court to allow access to his estate would certainly mean he would 
get counsel which this Court has refused the Plaintiff for the past 
nine months. It is clear the Court has a bias for Marilyn Brown and 
against Robert H. Peterson since he is acting pro-se since every 
single proposal submitted by Marilyn Brown has been rubber stamped 
and every submission made by the Plaintiff has been denied no 
matter how benign that petition might be. The Court would like to 
cover up the crime committed by Marilyn Brown by coercing and lying 
to the Plaintiff to obtain his signature. Members of the Bar take 
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care of their own. The Court has not granted a hearing since this 
would enable the Plaintiff to put Marilyn Brown under oath and have 
her testify that she continued this atrocious crime after having 
been told twice by the Plaintiff that he was being coerced. 
2. At a hearing expert witnesses could be called in that 
would testify that the Plaintiff was coerced into signing away his 
half of the estate. The Court is not qualified to read the mind of 
the Plaintiff nor to pass any type of judgement concerning whether 
the Plaintiff was or was not coerced. However, there is no evidence 
that the Plaintiff was not coerced and a preponderance of evidence 
that he was coerced. Clearly 92% versus 8% is evidence of coercion 
to anyone that is not deaf and blind to the facts. 
3. There is no question that the Plaintiff was lied to. The 
clear evidence that he was lied to is in the Divorce Decree. The 
Decree states that each party was to pay their own attorney costs 
and in another place that Marilyn Brown should receive $1,000 from 
the Plaintiff's personal savings account. These small print 
additions, from one bargaining session to another, is standard 
procedure for Marilyn Brown. This is how the Plaintiff is to have 
something less than half of the Voice Mail lease. Half of this 
lease is $700/2 or $350. 
Dated this day the 26 th day of January 1993. 
Robert H. Peterson 
Robert H. Peterson acting pro se 
Box 437 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. PETERSON 
Plaintiff : REQUEST FOR A HEARING 
VS. : QUALIFIED DOMESTIC 
: RELATIONS ORDER 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON : 
Defendant : COMMISSIONER MAETANI 
: Civil No, 924400839 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Whereas the Plaintiff has been denied his basic constitutional 
rights, the right to an attorney, the right to a trial and the 
right to a hearing, the Plaintiff requests that this order be set 
aside so that an appeal can be made to the State Supreme Court. The 
Plaintiff requests a hearing to consider this matter. 
Whereas the Plaintiff has been coerced into signing the 
Divorce Decree by a conspiracy of this Court namely, Commissioner 
Maetani and counsel for the Defendant Ms. Brown, the Plaintiff 
therefore requests a property settlement trial and a Change of 
Venue. 
This conspiracy is as follows; 
1. The Court first stripes the opponent of all assets. The 
Bank accounts in the opponents name are frozen, the accounts in Ms. 
Browns clients name are not frozen. All joint accounts are frozen 
after Ms. Browns client has removed all of the assets of those 
EXHIBIT 6 
accounts. If she is caught taking money from frozen accounts that 
crime is not recognized by the Court as the crime of theft but is 
given the Courts okey. All investment income is directed to Ms. 
Browns client to be placed in secret accounts not frozen by the 
Court. All accumulated moneys from investments in accounts are 
given to Ms. Browns client. In my case a total of $41,000. All real 
estate together with all the income from that real estate is then 
granted Ms. Browns client (house $40,000, four-plex $60,000). These 
are all unlawful acts but the conspirators are ready for the 
objections by the opponent. They plot together what will happen in 
court. It goes like this; Ms. Brown stands up and tells the court 
what the issues are; what should be said by each person and what 
the Courts disposition shall be. She sits down and the rest is like 
water off a ducks back. She writes that disposition up and it is 
quickly signed. Never at any is there an opportunity for the 
opponent to have his say. We simply go through the motions of 
having court. This generates all kinds of records that favor the 
right client in case of a question. The Court then tells the 
opponent he has nothing to worry about since there will be an 
accounting of the money stolen from the bank accounts ($7,000 in my 
case), the money stolen from the investments and all of the real 
estate is in good hands. The second lie is like the first. That is 
that "this is just temporary". These lies are designed to make the 
opponent thing he will end up with his half of the estate (BY THE 
LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH) if he just keeps his mouth shut and 
stops objecting to this type of treatment. 
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2. The conspiracy then moves to the opponents income. Half 
of the take home pay is garnisheed. This is against the law but 
who's paying any attention to the divorce laws? The law states that 
only 25% can be taken. The object here is not to get more money 
since $30,000 is quit enough, but to keep the opponent from his 
assets and his income so that he will have no possibility of having 
counsel. This criminal act was done with $30,000 in cash of the 
family investments available to Ms. Browns client. This action 
insures the conspirators that the opponent will not have counsel 
and can be told any number of lies. It also assures that the estate 
will become that of the clients since at $2,500 a month with no 
mortgage payment for the idler, and $900 a month for the worker 
with a mortgage payment and his own housing costs to pay, the 
client can steal $2,000 a month away in secrete accounts. Money 
stolen from the marriage over the years is labeled "inherited" and 
thus Ms. Browns client never reveals her estate or her retirement 
so that she can take half of the opponents. 
3. The third technique is very simple just spin wheels. The 
Court is just to busy to have a trial. But if the opponent wants a 
divorce and a property settlement at a later date he is told that 
would cause him to loose his "incentive" to settle. Settle means to 
hand everything over. The opponent has his choice he can give the 
conspirators his estate at $2,000/month with the wheel spinning 
techniques of Ms. Brown or sign it all over at one time. I lasted 
seven months. My health and my ability to perform my work were at 
risk. It was clear this conspiracy would not allow a fair trial so 
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the only hope to have my constitutional rights restored was through 
the appeals court. 
This criminal conspiracy was more than I could handle. When 
Ms.Brown said she would give me my income back if I would sign over 
the estate and she would allow money to pay my doctor bills 
and debts, that appeared to be my opportunity to break the 
conspiracy. By selling my truck I am now debt free with 
no valuable assets of any kind. This was seen by me at the time as 
a means of escape from the criminal conspiracy that worked so well 
to circumvent the divorce laws of the state of Utah. 
In this conspiracy it does not matter what is written in the 
Divorce Decree. Self contradiction is okey. You can say in one 
place each party shall pay his or her own attorneys fees and in 
another the opponent is to pay Ms. Brown $1,000. You can lie about 
the the opponents consultation with an attorney and you can lie 
about the coercion of the opponent, and the Court will not 
recognize those lies and set the matter for trial as he is required 
to do by the law. 
Only those parts that involve getting money from the opponent 
are recognized by the conspirators. In my case I was awarded half 
of the lease for the pagers and the voice mail system. That is $700 
(voice mail lease) plus $195(pager lease) plus $97.5(pager lease) 
or 992.5/2 = $496.25/ month beginning Oct. 10, 1992. At this 
writing there is $2,977.50 stolen by the Defendant from the 
Plaintiff for the past six months. This and the tidbit about paying 
your own attorney's fees were put in the Divorce Decree to get the 
Plaintiff's signature. 
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There never was any intention to abide by this since the 
conspiracy is in tact. It will certainly be interesting to see what 
razzel-dazzle-legal-smeagle the conspirators come up with to 
circumvent the responsibility for this theft. However the QUEEN OF 
LIARS AND THE MASTER OF COERCION will certainly have something that 
sounds legitimate. Please donft use the lfitfs okey to steal before 
a certain date set by me, routine11 thatfs getting old. 
Signed this day the 22nd day of March 19S3. 
Robert H. Peterson Plaintiff 
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Robert H. Peterson acting pro se 
1373 East 400 South, 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. PETERSON 
Plaintiff : REQUEST FOR A HEARING 
vs. : QUALIFIED DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS ORDER 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON : 
Defendant : COMMISSIONER MAETANI 
: Civil No. 924400839 
1. Whereas the Plaintiff has been denied his basic constitutional 
rights, the right to an attorney, the right to a trial and the 
right to a hearing, the Plaintiff requests that this order be set 
aside so that an appeal can be made to the State Supreme Court. The 
Plaintiff requests a hearing to consider this matter. 
2. Whereas the Plaintiff has been coerced into signing the 
Divorce Decree by a conspiracy of this Court namely, Commissioner 
Maetani and counsel for the Defendant Ms. Brown, the Plaintiff 
therefore requests a property settlement trial and a Change of 
Venue. 
3. Whereas the Defendants latest fraud is the matter of a $3,500 
tax deduction. The QUEEN OF LIARS has written in her perverted 
Divorce Decree, that she would pay the two years of back payments 
due on the home in question, with part of the $14,000 in cash given 
to her by the Plaintiff from his personal savings account on the 
day before her perverted Divorce Decree was signed. However, since 
the conspiracy is in tact she decided not to pay that until 1993. 
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By so doing the QUEEN OF LIARS could save her client $3#500 on next 
years taxes. All of the other thefts committed by the QUEEN OF 
LIARS have been overlooked by this Court so why not one more for 
the road? This would also give the QUEEN OF LIARS and her client 
the mortgage payments for October, November and December. Since no 
accounting is required for the Queen's client this $1,600 might 
just as well be added to the theft for a grand total of $5,100. 
4. In addition to the above theft of $5,100 there is the matter 
of the pager/voice mail system lease income. Half of this was to be 
paid to the Plaintiff beginning Nov. 10 and is now seven months in 
the rears. The amount outstanding is now $ 3,473.75 for a total of 
$8,573.75 owed to the Plaintiff as stipulated in the QUEEN OF LIARS 
perverted Stipulation. She of course never had any intention of 
paying these amounts or abiding by the perverted Stipulation she 
wrote. Those items were put in there to get my signature by fraud 
and coercion. 
5. The Courts refusal to grant a hearing is understandable since 
the Court knows that expert witnesses would be available at that 
hearing to testify that my signature was obtained by coercion and 
that the QUEEN OF LIARS was told twice that I was being coerced. 
The Courts refusal to grant a hearing and the Courts refusal to 
hear the testimony of the expert witnesses verifies the 
conspiracy. This clearly constitutes malfeasance of office. 
It is malfeasance of office to sign the pack of lies having no 
accountability, created by the QUEEN OF LIARS. 
Dated this day the 3rd day ofJCtfay 1993. 
(KJ^ 
Robert H.Peterson (Plaintiff) 
